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The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional
Framework
ARTHUR S. MILLER*

& GEORGE M.

KNAPP**

The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical
statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of
powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic
sealing off of the three branches of government would preclude the
establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.,
INTRODUCTION

This article analyzes a recent important development in the division of
powers between Congress and the Executive. It is more speculative than
exhaustive. The aim is to provide a different perspective on a basic
constitutional concept.
It is assumed that the "practical statesmen" who wrote the Constitution
must have sought to establish a system of government which encouraged
interbranch cooperation and abhorred unnecessary conflict. Their major
premise was the necessity of achieving policies reflecting all societal
interests; 2 their goal was the achievement of meaningful communication
between the branches of government. Cooperation, rather than conflict,
was to be the operative principle. Only under such circumstances would
the products of the governmental process be superior to the products of
government under the Articles of Confederation.
Over the course of 190 years, these "practical statesmen" have been
accorded a unique status. They have been honored not only as political
philosophers of the highest caliber, but also as gifted prophets of the most
profound social and political changes. This has had significant consequences for constitutional scholarship. For if some scholars (and judges)
are to be believed, one need only refer to the writings of the framers to find
the answer to current political questions. The view that the "intent" of the
framers ought to control present day decisionmaking, however, produces,
*Professor of Law, George Washington University; A.B., 1938, Willamette Univ.; LL.B.,
1949, Stanford; J.S.D., 1959, Yale. Currently serving as one of the counsel for the House of
Representatives in Clark v. Valeo, No. 76-1825 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1977).
**B.A. 1975, U.C.L.A.; second-year student, George Washington University School of

Law.
'Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
rlhis reflection of all societal interests requires the existence of a balance of influence
between the numerous social forces which affect governmental institutions. See F. NEUMANN,
THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 96-148 (1957).
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as historian Michael Kammen has said, an "awkward anomaly in American
thought."'3 Professor Kammen continues:
Although the founders were themselves engaged in a continuous quest for
modes of legitimacy appropriate to their times and needs, subsequent
Americans have sought to validate their own aspirations by invoking the
innovations and standards of our hallowed pantheon as unchanging
verities. This nostalgic vision of the Golden Age actually conjures up an
era when values were unclearly defined, when instability often seemed
beyond control, when public rancor and private
vituperation were
4
rampant, and institutions frail and unformed.
Even if the ancient documents are considered to be dispositive on some
constitutional issues, these papers do not necessarily reflect a true consensus of the framers. To view The Federalist Papers, for example, as
determinative of a group or societal intent, one must ignore the fact that
this work is authoritative only to the extent that it reflects the views of three
articulate men who wrote as advocates, not as dispassionate scholars. Their
views were not shared by all participants at the Philadelphia Conventionnot even by the thirty-nine men who eventually signed the Constitution. In
fact, there are inconsistencies in some of the Papers that reflect a failure on
the part of Hamilton, Madison and Jay to resolve, among other things, the
fundamental question of the limits and nature of governmental interaction. 5 Constitutional issues, accordingly, should be analyzed in the light
of the system established by the framers as a group rather than in the
context of the arguments presented by a few of its members at the debates in
the Convention or in subsequent publications. Study of the system
requires an understanding of the key principles of governmental cooperation as the constitutional order has evolved, rather than analysis of general
statements of political theory advanced for partisan purposes. Since it is
impossible to read the minds of men long dead, explanation of the
implications of the concept of separation of powers requires consideration
of issues "in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of
what was said a hundred [or more] years ago."'6 Put more bluntly, the
Founding Fathers have been buried; they cannot and, indeed, should not
rule us from-their graves.

3

M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX 56 (1972).
41d.
5
Madison, in particular, did not resolve completely the issue of the limits of interaction.
In THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison), he maintained that the principle of separation of
powers permits a branch to have some agency of control over another branch. Yet, in THE
FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison), he argued that no branch should possess an "overruling
influence"
over another.
6
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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This examination of the "congressional veto" mechanisms discards as7
essentially irrelevant certain methods of analysis used by various scholars.
Rather than labeling the veto as "legislative" or "quasi-legislative," the
focus here will be upon its use as a means of legislative oversight. Our
examination will concentrate on the validity of the congressional veto as a
method of attaining the broad goal of interbranch cooperation central to
the constitutional system. We reject the view that conclusions drawn from
the debates of the Constitutional Convention or the writings of certain
individuals are controlling on this issue. Voices from the eighteenth
century provide useful information on the events to which the Constitution
was intended as a reaction. They are, however, but one of several criteria to
be employed today in constitutional decisionmaking. Their views cannot
be considered to be absolute authority. In fact, when specific statements of
the framers contradict the spirit of interaction among the branches and the
checks thereon which are at least implicit in the Document of 1787, these
statements should be rejected.
The congressional veto also requires analysis in light of the clear
alteration of the historical distribution of governmental power. Under the
traditional theory of separation of powers, "the rule is that in the actual
administration of the government, Congress or the Legislature should
exercise the legislative power, the President or the state executive, the
Governor, the executive power, and the courts or the judiciary the judicial
power . . . . ' But that is not now, nor has it ever been, entirely true. The
Constitution did not separate powers; it established a system of separated
institutions sharing power-a quite different, and indeed fundamental,
proposition.
The drafters of the Constitution listed specific acts of interbranch
intervention which are permissible. The President can veto certain acts of
Congress. 9 The Senate is allowed to participate in the appointment
process.' 0 Nowhere in the Constitution, however, does one find an explicit
provision permitting federal courts to invalidate acts of Congress or acts of
state governments." The fact that judicial intrusion into the legislative
process is considered legitimate today indicates the evolutionary nature of
the system of checks and balances. In other words, it is not per se improper
7
Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
467 (1962) [hereinafter cited as The Legislative Veto]; Ginnane, The Control of Federal
Administration by CongressionalResolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Control of FederalAdministration];Watson, CongressStepsOut: A Look
at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Congress Steps Out]; Small, The Committee Veto: Its Current Use and Appraisals of Its
Validity (January 16, 1967) (Library of Congress Congressional Res. Serv. Doc. No. JK 10150)
[hereinafter cited as Small, The Committee Veto].
gHampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (Chief Justice Taft).
9
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, ci. 3.
IOU.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
"Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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for checks to be instituted merely because the framers failed to provide
expressly for the situations which give rise to the need for the checks.
It is therefore contended that the use of the legislative veto should be
examined in the context of the shifting relationships of power which give
meaning to the system of "separation of powers." These relationships
require innovative methods of interbranch intervention to affect necessary
checks on newly asserted powers. The congressional veto is but one method
of obtaining some measure of control over the exercise of delegated powers.
The issue of its constitutionality requires study of whether the veto, as
currently used, serves to unduly hamper those governmental activities
which Congress has deemed appropriate to be performed by the executive
branch. The basic question is one of both law and policy: whether the veto
may be exercised by Congress, and if so, what institutional, changes might
be required to control its use.
THE

NEW

ALLOCATION OF POWERS

The framers surely did not foresee that a combination of congressional
delegation of powers and executive control over major sources of information would produce a situation where the President, the executive branch
generally, would become the major policy formulator. As Professor
Clinton Rossiter has said: "Presidential duties are not purely Executive in
nature. He is also intimately associated, by Constitution and custom, with
the legislative process, and we may therefore consider him to be the Chief
Legislator."1 2 If that be so, then a constitutional change of sweeping
proportions has taken place, without benefit of amendment. That change
necessitates concomitant adjustments in the historical view of "the"
legislative power.
Something was needed to prevent Congress from
becoming an organization with only ostensibly coequal powers, thereby
allowing the Executive to become even more powerful.
Part of that "something" is the increasing use of the congressional
veto. In the view of former Attorney General Edward Levi, this check on
the Executive is but one example of an "irreversible change in our
constitutional system."' 3 Its importance is seen in the fact that its use as a
means for congressional review of administrative actions produces "a new
and ironic reversal of roles-the executive making the laws and the
legislature wielding, in effect, the veto."' 4 That "veto," of course, is
extraconstitutional in that it is not expressly granted. But, as will be
shown, its existence can reasonably be implied from the constitutional text.
12C. ROSSITER, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 28 (2 ed. 1960).

"Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 371, 372 (1976). Levi
notes the expansion of governmental influence and the growth. of the bureaucracy as tther
examples of the change in the constitutional system.
141d.
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Furthermore, the veto is both statutory and nonstatutory. Most scholarly
attention -has been directed to the former only; little is known about
nonstatutory vetoes, but as will also be shown, they are likely to be more
important than their statutory counterparts.
Types of Mechanisms
A recent study has shown that "[n]o less than 295 separate provisions
adopted in 196 different Acts of Congress during the last forty-three years
(since June 30, 1932) have mandated some type of Congressional review
over or consent for contemplated or pending executive implementation of
those laws."1 5 These provisions, commonly known as the "congressional
veto," permit Congress, its committees and even specifically named
members to exert some form of control over executive actions.
The provisions include both informal and formal mechanisms of
legislative oversight. Although some controversy has developed over the
constitutional status of the "informal veto," 1 6 critical commentary has long
focused only on those statutes which authorize Congress or its committees
to control specific executive policies through passage of resolutions of
approval or disapproval. These statutes, referred to as the "legislative
veto," encompass a variety of control mechanigms.
In general, the statutory provisions share a variety of common
procedures. 17 Most require notification of Congress, or at least certain
congressional committees, of planned executive action. The difference
centers on the type of congressional response needed to prevent the
executive action. In some areas, resolutions of approval must be passed by
Congress or a prescribed committee before the executive may act. In most
cases, though, the executive action is deferred for a specified time period, at
the end of which the action becomes operative unless Congress or an
authorized committee has adopted a resolution of disapproval.
The most important aspect of the veto is that it prevents, or at least
postpones, executive actions from taking effect. The mechanism takes on
further significance since it operates to prevent the exercise of the
presidential veto power.
'5 Norton, Congressional Review, Deferral and Disapproval of Executive Actions: A
Summary and an Inventory of Statutory Authority (April 30, 1976) (Library of Congress
Congressional Res. Serv. 1) [hereinafter cited as Norton, Congressional Review]. Not all of the
295 provisions
are still on the statute books.
16
Control of Federal Administration, supra note 7, at 603, notes President Truman's

reaction to a bill, H.R. 3096, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), which would have required certain
executive officials to "come into agreement" with the Armed Services Committees of each
House over certain land purchases. Truman's veto message expressed his concern over the
"gradual trend on the part of the legislative branch to participate to an even greater extent in
the actual execution and administration of the laws." H.R. Doc. No. 133, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1951).
17Norton, Congressional Review, supra note 15, at 2-3.
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The most commonly used formal method of congressional veto is the
concurrent resolution,' 8 which initially appeared in 1919. The Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations proposed that provisions should be
attached to the Versailles Treaty which would permit membership in the
League of Nations to be terminated on passage of a concurrent resolution. 9
Since 1919 the concurrent resolution has been employed as a means of
retaining control over certain statutory grants of authority.20 At present,
such a resolution may be used to, inter alia, terminate specified actions of
the armed forces, 21 revoke acts passed by the District of Columbia
government, 22 limit expenditure of funds for the assistance of specified
Middle East countries, 23 and prevent sales of defense supplies or services in
excess of $25 million to foreign countries.2 4 In the view of Congress, these
resolutions do not come within article I, section 7 of the Constitution, and
thus are operative without being submitted to the President for his
approval or veto. That, however, is an unresolved constitutional question
as there has been no Supreme Court decision on point.
The "one-House" veto, however, became the first form of legislative
veto to be exercised by the Congress. In 1932 the President received
authority to reorganize executive departments and agencies under the terms
of the Legislative Appropriation Act.2 5 The reorganization proposals,
however, could be terminated should either House pass a resolution of
26
disapproval. Failure to act meant that the reorganization went into effect.
The statutory power of one House of Congress to control designated
executive proposals and regulations has also been extended. One-House
veto provisions are included in statutes which grant power to block
"impoundment" decisions made by the President, 27 fund authorizations
Is1d. at 4-5. Norton counts 36 statutory provisions which require both Houses to pass
concurrent resolutions expressing either approval or disapproval. He finds only 27 provisions
which enable actions to be terminated or prevented through the actions of just one House of
Congress.
19Control of Federal Administration, supra note 6, at 575, summarizing 58 CONG. REc.
8074 20
(1919).
For a discussion of the historical development of this veto mechanism in general, see
Steps Out, supra note 7, at 1002-28.
Congress
21
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. III 1973).
22
District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 29, 31, 40 U.S.C).
23Amendments to Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974)
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
(codified
24
Amendments to Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1813 (1974)
(codified
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
25
Pub. L.No. 72-212, 47 Stat. 413 (1932) (eliminated in the 1966 U.S.C. by Pub. L. No. 89554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966).
26Although the President's reorganization power has now lapsed because Congress failed
to renew the statute, President Carter has requested that it be renewed. See N.Y. Times, Nov.
18, 1976, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1977, at 12, cols. 1-2.
21Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. § 11 (Supp. IV
1974).
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for construction of the Diego Garcia naval base, 28 regulations governing
public access to the tapes and papers of President Nixon, 29 defense contracts
in excess of $25 million,3 0 and regulations proposed by the Federal
31
Elections Commission.
If the goal of legislative vetoes is prompt and effective control of
executive actions, the one-House resolution provides an easier means for
Congress to express its disapproval than the concurrent resolution which
requires the passage of duplicate resolutions. Should, however, the goal
be that of forcing greater disclosure of proposed executive actions, the
committee veto becomes important. It not only enables a congressional
committee to be fully informed of the details of an executive action, but
also permits a more focused and lengthy study of the merits of a given
proposal.
Committee vetoes were rarely used before World War II. Of the
provisions currently in force, only a minority should be considered to be
statutory legislative vetoes.3 2 Most statutory provisions merely require
agencies to consult with appropriate committees before implementing
proposed policies.33 The consultation requirement, however, permits a
powerful, albeit informal, method of congressional control. Agencies
34
usually acknowledge and honor the objections raised by the committees.
As a formal tool of legislative oversight, the committee veto is
important as a means of corltrolling limited fields of executive operations.
Of the twenty provisions that give committees the right to prevent
promulgation of planned regulations or activities, 3 5 most noteworthy are
those relating to experimental educational programs,3 6 reclamation and
irrigation projects,3 7 and construction proposals.38 The committee veto is
more interesting for its limited scope than for its use as a means for the
28

Military Construction Authorization Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-552,88 Stat. 1745, 1766
(codified
29 in scattered sections of 3, 10, 18, 31 U.S.C.).
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat.
1695 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.).
1
Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-155,
87 Stat. 605 (1973) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 15, 22, 42, 50 U.S.C.).
3Federal
Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C § 438(c) (Supp. V 1975).
32
Small, The Committee Veto, supra note 7, at 6.
3
3id. at 7-19. Most notable of the provisions which require a waiting time before
executive branch proposals may become effective are the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000(d) (1) (1970); Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d) (Supp. III 1973);
and the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C. § 98(b)(e) (1970).
34
Small, The Committee Veto, supra note 7, at 7.
35
Norton, Congressional Review, supra note 15, at 5.
36
Education Amendments of 1974, Special Projects Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484
(1974) 7(codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
3Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 422 et seq. (Supp. V
1975).
SsCongress Steps Out, supra note 7, at 1093 (APPENDIX B).
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effective control of major executive policy decisions.3 9 Again, its constitutional validity is unsettled.
Finally, there are nonstatutory legislative vetoes which have arisen
through long continued practice. Often, though certainly not always, the
nonstatutory vetoes arise in the way appropriation statutes are administered. They are a means by which prescriptions from both Houses of
Congress may be altered through accommodations reached between administrative officers and committee chairmen.4 0 They are a form of committee
veto, but without authorization in statute. These vetoes occur, for example,
in "reprogramming" appropriated funds and have become so routine that
the pfocedures are now published by the Department of Defense. 41 Reprogramming means shifting funds from one project to another within a
budget account. It should be distinguished from "transfers," which are
transactions between accounts-from one to another.4 2 This type of
legislative veto or approval finds the administrator conferring with
committee members, seeking to reallocate appropriated funds. If, for instance, $100 million is appropriated to the Army to buy widgets, and subsequently it is determined by the Army that gadgets are better than widgets, the
$100 million can, if the appropriate committees approve, be reprogrammed to
buy gadgets. That transaction is a neat circumvention of the full legislative
process, but no one, least of all the Executive, complains. Far from being
controversial, it is an extraconstitutional means by which many tasks of
government can be accomplished without going through the full legislative
process.
In a complex, technologically oriented society, government could
hardly operate without use of nonstatutory, informal accommodations that
have been developed between executive and congressional officials. Should
the statutory congressional veto be judicially invalidated, the nonstatutory
web of interactions that make up a substructure of government in spite of
the facade of separation of powers would, a fortiori, be at least imperiled, if
not also rendered illegal. The mechanisms of nonstatutory vetoes are a
classic illustration of the fact that separation of powers means cooperation
as much or more than it means conflict. There are, in other words,
compelling policy reasons for not disturbing the status quo, reasons that
suggest that the judiciary would be ill-advised to trench upon the web of
39l'he Director of the Bureau of the Budget, after receiving approval of the Chairman of
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, was permitted to amend a
circular which described government policy on rents for federal employees living quarters.

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1953, Pub. L. No. 82-547, 66 Stat. 637 (1952) (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 5, 31, 40, 50 U.S.C.).
40
L. FISHER, PRESIDENTAL SPENDING POWER 75-98 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENTAL SPENDING].
41

Department of Defense Directive, Reprogramming of Appropriated Funds, No. 7250.5,
§ II, 4col.4
(May 21, 1970).
2
PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING, supra note 40, at 76.
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accommodations that enable the government to act. Those who challenge
the congressional veto apparently do not realize what a declaration of
unconstitutionality would do to the arrangements of mutual benefit, and
presumably of public benefit, that have developed over the past several
decades. One of two quite undesirable consequences would result: either
the Executive would be given untrammelled power to "execute" the laws
without significant check, or Congress would have to legislate precisely
and narrowly on each subject. The former alternative would mean an even
greater absence of accountability than now exists; the latter would so slow
government that urgent needs would not be met.
The Need for the Congressional Veto

Changing socioeconomic relationships in the exercise of governmental
powers require new checks and balances. It may be true, as Joseph Harris
has said, that Congress has made "broad delegations of authority to the
executive departments because of the size and complexity of their operations." 43 But other factors indicate the need for Congress to give itself a
veto power over executive exercise of delegated authority. These include
the following:
1. The environment in which Congress operates has drastically
changed. The size of the institutions in our pluralistic nation is increasing
exponentially, as compared with 1787, and this greatly complicates the
decisionmaking process. Congress has not changed structurally in any
essential manner since the first Congress, even though socioeconomic and
political conditions have been completely altered.
2. There is more diversity in the United States as a result of mass
higher education and a rising level of income.
3. There has been a knowledge explosion. The amount of information available is beyond the capacity of anyone, even any institution, to
assimilate.
4. The scope and nature of governmental activity has been vastly
expanded, particularly since the "constitutional revolution" of the 1930's.
Government has changed from the "negative, nightwatchman state" to one
which has assumed affirmative obligations.
5. The United States is part of a global village existing on Spaceship
Earth. This means that literally every place on this planet, as well as the
places in the unimaginable reaches of space, is of importance to the nation,
and thus to Congress.
6. The power of the President, as one person, and of the presidency, as
an institution, has increased beginning with Woodrow Wilson and taking
an exponential leap with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his successors.
4

3J.

HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL

CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION

246 (1964).
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This poses critical problems for time honored concepts of "separation of
powers."
7. There is an institutional deficiency in the means with which to
hold the public administration generally, and the President specifically,
accountable in any systematic manner.
8. Generally speaking, there is a knowledge deficiency on Capitol
Hill, both in Congress and in the staff. Both tend to be captive to what the
Executive wishes to tell them.
9. Congress recesses or adjourns for periods of time, both short and
long. For example, it adjourned on October 2, 1976, and was not scheduled
to return until January 1977. During all that time, the executive branch
was at work. Government cannot stop simply because Members of
Congress want to run for office.
10. Congress tends to react to problems rather than compiling sets of
well considered goals towards which it wishes to move. Accordingly, it is
always on the defensive. It waits for the executive branch to establish
priorities, which can then be defined in terms of particularized congressional interests, because there is no institutional capability to project
future, nonspecific needs. Nor, for that matter, is there any such capability
elsewhere in government, although some agencies at least try to think
about the future. Without a comparable effort by Congress, both Houses
will forever be playing "catch up."
These societal and governmental factors assume greater significance
when viewed in the context of growing congressional recognition that it is
necessary to develop some mechanism to ensure that powers delegated to
the executive branch are exercised in the contemplated manner. Therefore,
increased use of the congressional veto should be understood as an attempt
to formulate "legislation which would give Congress some type of veto
over Executive Branch rules and regulations judged to be inconsistent with
'44
the legislative intent of the authorizing statute.
The congressional veto, statutory and nonstatutory, is by no means the
only method Congress has to insure that the policies embodied in its
statutes are not defeated by executive branch implementation. As Professor
Davis has noted, Congress "can and does revoke or modify grants of
authority, it uses its power of appropriation to control the general direction
of policy, the Senate uses the power to confirm or reject appointments, and
the various committees listen to complaints and allow administrators to
explain their policies."45 But these procedures are inadequate to the need;
they have not kept up with increased executive power.
4FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED
EMERGENCY POWERS, S. REP. No. 94-922, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 16 (1976).
451 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.08, at 387 (1958).
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Congressional committees have recognized that the traditional legislative checks are not sufficient to oversee executive action. For example, in
discussing section 206 of the Marine Fisheries Conservation Act of 1975,46
which permits either House to disapprove certain international fisheries
agreements, a House committee stated:
[T]hese procedures [veto mechanisms] recognize that the oversight role of
Congress cannot be effectively undertaken unless there is adequate review
and deliberation before these agreements become a reality. Given the
clearcut and uniform requirements embodied in section 201, which will
govern all agreements authorizing foreign fishing, it is unlikely that either
House of Congress will be compelled to disapprove an agreement. Section
206 would simply guarantee that requirementswill be religiously followed
47

in the future.

That the congressional veto is a necessary method of enforcing the
requirement that the Executive comply with legislative policy has long
been the major claim of the veto's supporters. 48 They note that the typical
methods of legislative oversight cannot serve to safeguard the congressional interest in policy implementation that follows statutory prescriptions. Threats to reduce appropriations may serve to prevent specific
contraventions of congressional directives, but the mere fact that Congress
reduces a specific appropriations account does not raise sufficient pressure
on the executive branch to force implementation of a policy that it wishes
to ignore. 49 Investigations may help focus attention on flagrant violations
of policy directives, but they cannot operate as a means for providing
information necessary for a detailed assessment of the pattern of executive
response. 50 Finally, the revision of statutes, with the sometimes insurmountable requirement that presidential vetoes be overruled, may not serve
as an effective method to revoke those powers which the Executive has a
vested interest in continuing to exercise. The Supreme Court noted as
much in Sibbach v. Wilson.51 Traditional oversight techniques, unlike the
legislative veto, cannot be adequately used "to make sure that the action
under the delegation squares with the congressional purpose." 52 Sibbach is
the leading judicial expression on congressional vetoes; the case, however,
dealt not with executive actions, but with the power of Congress to "veto"
new rules of procedure in the federal courts.
The basic issue which must now be decided is whether congressional
retention of a power to review actions of the Executive taken pursuant to
' 6Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 203, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1823).
17H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1975) (emphasis added).
48
The Legislative Veto, supra note 7.
191d. at 508.
0
5 d.at 510.
"Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
52Id. at 15.
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delegated authority is consistent with the constitutional allocation of
governmental powers. Resolution of that issue requires study of the
constitutional system itself, at least insofar as separation of powers is
concerned. Analysis of the constitutional arguments that critics and
supporters of the veto have presented will set forth the conflicting
considerations.
THE MUDDLED

DEBATE

In determining the appropriate test for evaluating the constitutionality
of the legislative veto, it is important to note particular aspects of past
analysis. Past discussion has focused on three issues: delegation of
congressional authority, avoidance of the presidential veto power, and
intrusion into executive actions. In attempting to give meaning to these
concepts, fundamental analytical problems have developed. When reliance
is made on provisions of the Constitution and writings of its major
theoreticians, certain logical inconsistencies occur. These inconsistent
conclusions have been either ignored or rationalized into oblivion.
Problem 1: Determining the Limits on Delegation
While some scholars have explored and defined the limits on the
exercise of the legislative veto in the concurrent resolution form, others
have focused attention on the question of the constitutionality of the oneHouse and committee resolution forms of the veto. This latter question is
usually answered in a manner consistent with findings made on the
validity of the concurrent resolution. If the commentator has felt that the
legislative veto is within the proper scope of congressional activity, it is not
unusual that the conclusion will be reached that all its manifestations are
also constitutional.5 3 Should the commentator believe that Congress as a
whole cannot exercise the veto power, the general conclusion will be
reached that either its committees or one House acting alone may not
exercise this power.
The delegation issue, not surprisingly, is more noteworthy for the logic
employed in certain arguments than for the conclusions that are reached.
The central issue is whether Congress may delegate to one House or to a
committee the power to use veto resolutions.5 4 Criticism of that type of
delegation was first succinctly expressed by President Eisenhower. While
53

Note, however, that the approval given is subject to a qualification. The Legislative
Veto, supra note 7, at 477, suggests that the committee veto may be exercised properly only if
the subject
matter in question is within the usual scope of the committee.
54
Control of Federal Administration, supra note 7, at 569-70, phrases the issue in the
following manner: "(D]o these statutes represent attempts by Congress ...to vest legislative
power in a single House or in a congressional committee?"
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approving a bill which permitted either the Senate or House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs to disapprove certain projects by committee
resolution, 55 the President stated that he "did not believe that the Congress
can validly delegate to one of its committees the power to prevent executive
action taken pursuant to law."5 6 Such congressional action, in his view,
constituted unlawful congressional delegation to its committees of the
legislative function "which the Constitution contemplates the Congress
itself, as an entity, should exercise." 57 This objection is predicated on the
premise that "[t]he Framers intended that the concurrence of both Houses
be required except in those cases specifically provided for elsewhere in the
Constitution, as in the treaty-making and appointment powers enumerated
in Article II." 51 It is argued that since disapproval has the effect of
modifying or repealing part of the statute, it is equivalent to a legislative
act. Therefore, it is said that such action must follow the usual express
constitutional procedures for enactment of legislation. 59 The argument,
when its premises are applied with any measure of consistency, produces
some interesting conclusions. Professor Bernard Schwartz has argued:
[I]f the holding that the legislature cannot be given the power to amend a
rule . . . were consistently applied in an inflexible manner, it would
practically destroy the rule-making power of the administrative agencies
themselves . . . [A]gencies themselves are given the power to make laws
through their rules; otherwise, how can the legislature be enacting a
change in the law through its annulment power. But if that is true,
following the rigid separation of powers approach, are not its delegations
of such law-making power to the agencies equally invalid?60
Additional conceptual problems are raised in the context of the
discussion of the delegation doctrine. The critic must argue that the
delegation of executive authority violates some constitutional principle.
When multiple grounds of objection, bicameralism and usurpation, are
raised, care must be taken to prevent inclusion of mutually exclusive
theories in an otherwise internally consistent argument. The unconstitutionality of the committee veto cannot be based on the view that, on the one
hand, it is legislative action under article I, and, on the other hand, that it
impermissibly projects congressional committees into a domain reserved
for the executive branch. 61 That argument is logically untenable; if
55

Small Reclamation Projects Acts of 1956, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 422 et seq. (Supp. V.

1975). 56

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. PUB. PAPERS 1956, at 648-50 (Aug. 6, 1956).
571d.
5
8Brief for Plaintiff at 52, Clark v. Valeo, No. 76-1825 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
51U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
60
Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: 1.
American
Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031, 1043 (1955).
61
Small, The Committee Veto, supra note 7, at 66.
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Congress can validly enact a committee veto through compliance with the
requirement of the presentation clause,6 2 it would be able to directly control
executive action.
Problem 2: Determining the Effect of the
Presidential Veto Clause
Those who seek to analyze the constitutionality of the veto clause in
terms of its effect on the presidential veto power are faced with a major
quandary. A decision must first be made as to whether the congressional
veto, in either its general or individual manifestations, is to be considered
an "Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary. '63 In making this decision,
support usually is drawn from what limited explanations exist as to the
meaning of the key terms.
References are made to the debates at the Constitutional Convention in
attempts to indicate how the phrasing of the presentation clause was
achieved. Reliance on history, however, surely does not provide a clear
indication of what the framers "intended." We know that Madison felt
that "if the negative of the President was confined to bills, it would be
evaded by acts under the form and names of Resolutions, votes, etc." 64 This
proposal, although rejected on August 15, 1787, was adopted in a "new
form" the next day. What is not known is why the framers felt the need to
include Madison's suggested addition. It could be argued that since the
framers left little guidance as to what the terms in the presentation clause
were to mean, it should be interpreted strictly. Legislative veto by
concurrent resolution, accordingly, would have to be presented to the
President. Other forms, which do not by their terms require concurrence
by both Houses of Congress, would be exempt from presidential review.
The folly of using a strict interpretation is obvious. As one commentator
recently wrote: "It verges on irrationality to maintain that action by
concurrent resolution, whereby Congress is at least held in check by its own
structure, is invalid because the veto clause so states, but that the invalidity
of a simple resolution, wherein a single House acts without check, is more
65
in doubt."
Some commentators try to avoid the pitfalls of strict interpretation of
the presentation clause either by referring to the fragmentary reports of
Constitutional Convention debates or by invoking "precedent." To them,
that clause is to be viewed as presenting a flexible concept,6 6 and attention
62U.S. CONST., art. I,
6
3d.
641 M. FARRAND,
6
sCongress Steps
66

§ 7, cl. 3.

RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 301-02 (1966).
Out, supra note 7, at 1066 n. 428.
Logical consistency should require that other concepts, especially such nebulous
themes as "checks and balances" and "separation of powers," be accorded the same treatment.
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thus must focus on what types of congressional action must be presented to
the President. The issue, though rephrased by individual scholars, becomes
one of "whether exercise of the' 67veto constitutes 'legislating' in the sense
regulated by the Constitution.
Opponents of the congressional veto generally structure their attack
along the following lines:
1. A determination is made of the type of congressional actions that
ought to be subject to presidential review. The premise is generally
68
accepted that only "non-legislative, non-policymaking concurrent action"
is exempt from presidential review. Critics recognize that some policymaking acts, such as proposed constitutional amendments, are exempt
from presidential veto. 69 Therefore, congressional activity subject to
presidential review must be both "legislative" and "policymaking" in
character.
2. An attempt is then made to define the framers' "intent" in giving
the President the power to be involved in the legislative process through
exercise of the veto. After analysis of the debates at the Constitutional
Convention and the writings of one Publius, two conclusions are usually
drawn. First, the veto power is seen as "part of the legislative procedure
primarily to give the President a defensive weapon against congressional
encroachment upon his constitutional powers, and only secondarily as a
check against unwise action." 70 Second, the President's veto power is not
to be avoided merely because "policy decisions having the force of law" are
embodied in the form of resolutions which permit Congress to control the
7
final government decision. '
3. The legislative veto is defined as a mechanism having the effect of
law since it sets policy and has a "public effect." 72 In fact, concurrent
resolutions are seen as "indistinguishable from the policy decisions and
73
legal consequences of ordinary legislation."
4. Exercise of the control mechanisms of the legislative veto is viewed
as an encroachment on the "executive function" to administer the laws
since it gives the legislative branch power to approve or disapprove
74

executive acts.

5. The legislative veto is. unconstitutional as currently formulated.
Proposals for specific exercise of congressional control must be received by
the President so that he can exercise his veto power.
67

The Legislative Veto, supra note 7, at 474.
61Control of Federal Administration, supra note 7, at 573.
69

Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). There are no cases on point, but
declarations of war would not be subject to presidential veto.
presumably
70
THE FEDERALST No. 73 (A. Hamilton).
Control of Federal Administration, supra note 7, at 593, 595.

71

72Brief for Plaintiff at 47, Clark v. Valeo, No. 76-1825 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
7SControl of FederalAdministration, supra note 7, at 593-594.
7137 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 56, 58 (1933).
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That analysis, seemingly logical at first glance, has debilitating
shortcomings as a fundamental constitutional test. The argument permits
congressional disapproval of executive actions so long as each exercise of
control is presented to the President for his approval or veto. Thus, if the
President accepts the congressional statement, or if a veto is overridden,
Congresi would be constitutionally permitted to direct executive activities.
In other words, by following proper procedure Congress would be able to
"interfere" with the "execution of the laws." Surely that interference is
contrary to the view that "the executive power" connotes an independent
residuum of presidential power unreachable by congressional action.
To use a different approach, the legislative veto, not being "legislative
in effect," need not be presented to the President. As a matter of
constitutional doctrine, however, it is invalid because it impermissibly
invades the President's powers. That analysis, at best, is circular; it
assumes the answer in the statement of the premises. The question is
whether the term "the executive power" in article II has a substantive
content unreachable by any type of congressional action. But one cannot
use questions as reasons or make a question an unassailable first premiseeven though the Supreme Court at times has been guilty of that intellectual
75
sin.
Rational analysis no doubt can be devised to avoid the problems of
internally inconsistent doctrines. Use of the veto power test, however,
raises additional constitutional difficulties. The issue is whether the
President, who is sworn to faithfully execute the laws, may act so as to alter
those conditions which Congress has placed by law on the exercise of
statutory powers. More specifically, does the "horizontal effect" 76 of article
I, section 8, clause 18, mean that Congress has the constitutional power to
exert control over the exercise of executive authority? This is an unresolved
constitutional question. The plain meaning of the "necessary and proper"
clause, however, would seem to indicate that the ultimate power is
congressional-that Congress, in other words, can condition its delegation
of powers by placing limits on the delegates so as to insure compliance
with congressional intent. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
places restrictions on some curbs; for example, "the means devised in the
77
execution of a power granted" must not be forbidden by the Constitution.
No such infirmity exists with respect to the congressional veto. The
question is whether the power to veto executive action through passage of a
resolution impliedly avoids the requirements of the presentation clause.
75
See,
76

e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining the Incidental Powers of the
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the HorizontalEffect of the "Sweeping
Clause," 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 788 (1975)._
77ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 473 (1894). See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL

DECISIONMAKXING 806-09 (1975); Note, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 144 (1968).
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The conflict between the veto and the necessary and proper clause of
article I is not one that may be readily resolved. The Supreme Court tends
to defer to congressional actions in most cases. In the Legal Tender
Cases,78 for example, the Court stated that "sound construction of the
Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with
respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned
to it." 79 In the case of the congressional vetoes, the issue is whether the
means devised to control the execution is "proper" under the Constitution.
There can be little doubt that they are "necessary" to ensure faithful
adherence to the congressional purpose. But if they conflict, at least
impliedly, with the President's veto power, they should be invalidated.
Whether such a conflict in fact exists is answerable neither by reference to
constitutional text nor by the intentions of those who wrote that text; as
with all constitutional issues, it is not logically deducible from the
Constitution. The question, in brief, is one of "policy"-of the political
theory appropriate to the times and the circumstances. That theory must
take into consideration the need for institutional adjustments to counteract
the growth of power in the executive branch. Absent such innovations,
executive power, already dangerously unaccountable, will become completely out of external control-a development contrary to the letter and
spirit of American constitutionalism.
It cannot be stated with assurance that the laws which authorize
congressional control over executive actions are per se inconsistent with the
"letter and spirit of the Constitution."80 Consideration of the constitutionality of the congressional veto, by focussing on the second, "forgotten"
half of article I, section 8, clause 18, means that Congress should be able to
control executive activities authorized by statute. The plain meaning of the
power to make laws "necessary and proper" to carry into effect the powers
"vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof" leads ineluctably to that conclusion, a
conclusion that comports with the quintessence of the fundamental law, in
that it permits reasonable checks to be placed on the exercise of power.
Problem 3: Understanding the Meaning of
Separation of Powers
The belief that the congressional veto may be properly examined in the
context of the "separation of powers" is difficult to sustain. The
"doctrine" has not been defined by the courts in any manner which would
be dispositive on the isue of the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
78See, e.g., Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
79d.
at 539.
B0Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 283 (1892).
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Nonetheless, the separation of powers argument must be faced. Under this
argument, exercise of the congressional veto constitutes an impermissible
interference with executive action, rather than merely being an exercise of a
power granted to Congress by a statute. The veto power is undoubtedly an
interference with the administration of the laws. To suggest otherwise may
be "to brush aside or ignore a wealth of authoritative precedent."' a But do
these precedents indeed exist? Or, if they do, are they "authoritative"? If so,
there is a source of analytical thought arguably free from the internally
inconsistent arguments that result from presentation of a separation of
powers question in terms of what is "legislative" and what is "executive."
It is doubtful that these precedents exist: "[F]actually relevant federal
precedents condemning the legislative veto as an impermissible legislative
82
invasion of the executive domain are not available for citation."
Analysis of the legislative veto may, however, focus on cases where
traditional separation of powers arguments were used to resolve claimed
intrusions on executive authority. Major cases in this area are Springer v.
Philippine Islands8' and Buckley v. Valeo, 4 where the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional attempts by legislative bodies to share the executive
power of appointment.85 Neither of these cases, nor theoretically similar
state cases,8 6 have addressed the specific issue of whether the congressional
veto can be used to control executive actions. Buckley specifically left the
question unanswered; but Justice White, concurring, opined that "the
provision for congressional disapproval of agency regulations does not
appear to transgress the constitutional design, at least where the President
has agreed to legislation establishing the disapproval procedure or the
legislation has been passed over his veto." 87 That position is unassailable.
Discussion of "precedent" eventually becomes a mere recitation of the
traditional separation of powers themes of control and conflict. Since the
relevant cases, including Sibbach, cite a history that is incomplete and an
intent of the framers that is in fact unascertainable, both critics and
supporters of the congressional veto can find support for their arguments.
Resolution of constitutional issues framed in terms of the separation of
powers doctrine requires an understanding of the conflicting purposes
assigned to that "sacred maxim of free government."8 8 Separation of
powers is not a doctrine in the sense of positive law; it is a political theory
concerning a system of allocation of governmental powers. It reflects the
consensus of the thirty-nine individuals who signed the Document of 1787
81

Small, The Committee Veto, supra note 7, at 42.
821d. at 43.
-277 U.S. 189 (1928).
84424 U.S. 1 (1976).
85U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cI. 2.
6
887See Norton, Congressional Review, supra note 15, at 44-47.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 286 (1976).
8
sTHE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
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on what was then perceived as the permissible limits of governmental
interaction. But use of it as a standard for judging the constitutionality of
activities not foreseen is made impossible by the fact that the framers did
not agree on what the doctrine specifically meant. The term was not used
in the tripartite division of powers. It is merely an inference drawn from
the first three articles of the Constitution.
To individuals such as Madison and Hamilton, separation of powers
may have had a special meaning of institutional conflict. Powers, said
Madison, were separated and specifically allocated to "guard against
concentration of the power of governance in the same hands."8 9 Even with
separation, however, it was foreseen that one branch might intrude on the
prerogatives of another in a manner not consonant with the Constitution.
To prevent this interference, institutional restraints were designed to allow
the affected branch a method of self-defense. As Madison stated:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others. The provisions of defense must in this,
as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of
attack ....
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this; you must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.90
The problem, in brief, is that "a gradual concentration of ... powers in the
same department" has in fact occurred, with the consequent need for
institutional invention to cope with that unforeseen development.
The Madisonian conception of institutional conflict poses a key
question: If conflict is the norm, can different modes of self-defense be
established to meet changing forms of intrusion? Madison and Hamilton
are silent on this point. Some analysts, though, argue that governmental
branches can only exercise those control mechanisms which are expressly
granted in the Constitution. For example, referring specifically to the
legislative veto, Watson states:
The fact that the historical precedent for the current use of congressional
extra-legislative power was strictly confined in scope and emerged after
89Id.
90THE FEDERALIST

No. 51 (J. Madison) (emphasis added).
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considerable debate over congressional control of executive power, suggests
that the practices would have been regarded as improper by the Framers
and their early successors. Likewise, no support for extra-legislative
control of the executive can be derived by analogy from the non-legislative
roles granted to the Congress by the Constitution; these functions are
explicitly stated, and the ways in which they may be exercised are narrowly
specified. 91
The difficulty with that argument is at least twofold. First, it would
defy rational analysis to assume that the Founding Fathers felt that the
Executive could protect itself from congressional interference, 92 but that
Congress could not seek to maintain some control over powers it delegated,
since the framers did not anticipate that the flexibility implicitly given to
the Executive in administration might be used to frustrate policy goals set
by Congress. Second, it must be considered, as has been said above, that the
second part of article I, section 8, clause 18 means precisely what it saysthat Congress has power to make laws "necessary and proper" to carry into
effect the "powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or office thereof." An argument based
on historical analysis of the framers' intent cannot ignore some plain
constitutional language while giving implied, "inherent" effect to parts of
article II. A rigid view of separation of powers thus does not provide an
adequate method of constitutional analysis. It does not serve to "oblige"
an executive dominated government, such as we now have, "to control
itself."
AN ALTERNATIvE TEST

Potential Cases
As long as reliance is placed on contradictory theoretical data and
unclear "tests," it is doubtful that the issue of the constitutionality of the
legislative veto will be coherently and comprehensively resolved. The
judiciary, however, will eventually have to decide cases which raise a
specific challenge to the legislative veto. 93 Judges must be prepared to give
a complete and understandable analysis of the constitutional implications
of the veto. This requires that those techniques which have served only to
muddle past analysis, that is, attempting to label the veto and employing
strict theoretical interpretation of the separation of powers, be rigorously
91
Congress
92

Steps Out, supra note 7, at 1030.
Such intrusion had actually occurred under the Articles of Confederation. See generally
C. ROSSiTER, 1787 THE GRAND CONVENTION 46-57 (1966).
93
The case of Clark v. Valeo, No. 76-1825 (D.C. Cir. 1977), highlights the practical
difficulties involved in challenging the legislative veto. The plaintiff must allege sufficient
acts so as to convince a court that an actual "case or controversy" exists. Even if such showing
is made, the plaintiff must avoid attacking the legislative veto process, for such claim might be
considered to raise a "political question."
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avoided. Further, judges should appreciate two other important factors: (a)
that a declaration of unconstitutionality of the statutory legislative veto
could well jeopardize many established nonstatutory procedures that inure "
to the benefit of the Executive and, indeed, permit some urgent governmental work to be done; and (b) a recognition that with the rise of the
"imperial presidency" some alternative must be devised if accountability on
executive power is to be effected. Despite Watergate and President Nixon's
resignation, the presidency still dominates.
Three cases now in the judicial pipelines may provide the basis for a
95
definitive constitutional ruling: Clark v. Valeo, 94 Atkins v. United States,
and Pressler v. Simon.96 The second is, at this writing, still awaiting
decision; Clark, however, was decided on January 21, 1977 and Presslerwas
decided in October, 1976 by a three-judge federal district court. 7 Each
merits brief attention here. In Clark, Ramsey Clark, a voter and then a
candidate for the Democratic nomination for United States Senator from
New York, brought suit against the Senate, the House of Representatives,
and the Federal Elections Commission, seeking to have the "one-House"
veto of the Federal Elections Act 9 8 declared unconstitutional. 99 At the trial,
District Judge Charles Richey, rather than deciding the procedural and
substantive issues, certified five questions to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 109 That court sat en banc to
hear argument on the questions together with a special three-judge court
made up of the district judge and two appeals judges. The Department of.
Justice sought intervention at the district court level under 24 U.S.C. 2403,
but this petition was denied by Judge Richey, who instead allowed
permissive intervention under rule 24(b).l01 At oral argument and in its
brief, the Justice Department, even though it had intervened on Clark's
side, maintained that Clark did not have standing to bring the suit. But the
court of appeals held that the suit was not ripe for adjudication and
remanded it to the district court with an order to dismiss it. That
conclusion clearly evidences judicial wariness to enter the political thicket
of the legislative veto.
In Atkins, 140 federal judges brought suit to recover back pay allegedly
owed them because Congress had not taken inflation into consideration
and had, accordingly, diminished the pay of judges contrary to the
94
No. 76-1825 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For other cases, see McCorkle v. United States, No. 761479 (4th Cir. 1976); Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., No. 76-3712 (5th
Cir. 1976).
9
5No. 41-76 (Ct. CL. 1976).
96No. 76-782 (D.D.C. 1976).
97Id.
9'Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 438(c) (Supp. V 1975).
99No. 76-1227 (D.D.C. 1976).
100Id., slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Aug. 13,1976). The certified questions include the constitutional
attacks on the veto mechanism and the article III issues of standing and ripeness.
01
' See note 99 supra & text accompanying.
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Constitution.1 02 At this writing, the Court of Claims has yet to rule on the
suit. As a part of the suit, the government, as represented by the
Department of Justice, "admitted" in oral argument that a congressional
veto in the Federal Salary Act of 1967 was unconstitutional-the same
position it took in Clark v. Valeo. The Justice Department further argued
that the judges' case was nonjusticiable.
Pressler was decided on October 12, 1976. It involved a suit by a
Member of Congress for a pay increase. Under the Postal Revenue arid
Salary Act of 1967103 and the Executive Salary Cost of Living Adjustment
Act of 1975,104 the President may recommend salary increases for, inter alia,
Members of Congress. Again, there is provision for a one-House veto, 05
which was in fact exercised in 1974 and 1976. Pressler, a Congressman,
brought suit under the "ascertainment" clause of the Constitution: "The
Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services
to be ascertained by law."'10 The three-judge court granted him standing to
sue under the doctrine of Kennedy v. Sampson,10 7 but then rejected his suit
on the merits. After noting the absence of relevant data in The Federalist
Papersor constitutional debates, the court went on to state:
Repeatedly during the discussions preceding its adoption, our founders
sought to preserve in the Constitution a flexible approach to government
that would facilitate accommodation to changing conditions and experience. The Constitution is not to be parsed in the narrow, rigid, pedantic
manner of a statute. It must remain flexible and adaptable, placing
reliance upon the checks-and-balances built into our tripartite format and
the sound attitude of voters expected at the polls. The "necessary and
proper" clause of Section 8 of the same Article [I] is but one expression of
this sound approach. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
The Salary Act and the Adjustment Act fix congressional compensation by law and these statutes are not prohibited by Article I, Section 6.
Neither of these Acts insofar as they govern ascertainment of congressional
compensation contravene the Constitution. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment is denied and the complaint is dismissed. 108
Pressler thus may be said to stand for the proposition that the necessary
and proper clause has both a "horizontal" and a "vertical" effect. That
clause, since McCulloch v. Maryland,'0 9 has been considered to apply
102Plaintiffs claim that the action of the Senate in disapproving the salary adjustments
submitted by the President under the Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (1970),

was unconstitutional.
10S2 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. (1970).
1042 U.S.C. § 31 (Supp. V 1975).
1052 U.S.C. § 359(1)(B) (1970).
lo6U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
107511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
' 08Pressler v. Simon, No. 76-782,
09

slip op. at 7-8 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1976).
1 McCulIoch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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almost entirely, insofar as the constitutional law of the Supreme Court is
concerned, with the vertical effect of enabling Congress to add implied
powers to the expressly delegated powers in the first seventeen clauses of
article I, section 8, and simultaneously to authorize, through the supremacy
clause, federal congressional control over an ever increasing amount of
state and local activities. The second part of clause 18 speaks horizontally
in terms of a similar congressional power over the other departments of
government. As said above, its meaning is plain and unequivocal. The
leading study of the clause's second, "forgotten" half maintains that the
broad sweep accorded the vertical portions of the necessary and proper
clause by the McCulloch doctrine is equally applicable to the horizontal.1 1 0
Or as Professor Charles Black has said, "The powers of Congress are
adequate to the control of every national interest of any importance,
including all of those with which the president might, by piling inference
on inference, be thought to be entrusted." '' If the Pressler case is a true
harbinger of judicial things to come, then surely Professor Black's views
will be validated. The answer may well come in the final resolution of
either Clark or Atkins, or both. The question still remains, though, as to
which of the available methods of analysis should be used to determine the
constitutionality of the legislative veto.
The Needed "Test": Separation of Powers as a
Political Principle
If, as has been argued, the historical notion of separation of powers is
not a sufficient test of constitutionality, either because it is not clear what
the framers intended when they divided responsibilities among the branches,
or because it is not valid to say that the original intention, even if
determinable, is controlling; then it becomes necessary to provide a better
standard of judgment. Such a standard is adumbrated here.
The conventional wisdom about separation of powers is that of Justice
Brandeis, dissenting in Myers v. United States,112 where he said that powers
were separated in the Constitution "not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution
0

H Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in DeterminingIncidental Powers of the President
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the HorizontalEffect of "The Sweeping Clause," 36
OHIO ST.L.J. 788 (1975). Professor Van Alstyne maintains that the second half of clause 18
assigns to Congress alone the responsibility to say by law what additional authority,
if any, the executive and the courts are to have beyond that core of powers that are
literally indispensable, rather than merely appropriate or helpful, to the performance of their express duties under articles II and III of the Constitution.
Id. at 799.
"'Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 HAsT. CONST.
L.Q. 13, 15, (1974).
112272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy 113 Modern scholars are beginning to refute that view, at
least in part. Powers were separated in 1787 asmuch to promote efficiency
as anything else. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Jay and James
Wilson all stressed the need for governmental efficiency as the principal
reason for establishing an executive independent from the legislature, for
under the Articles of Confederation government was both weak and
11 4
inefficient.
A major conclusion that should be drawn from analysis of the
Constitutional Convention is that the framers adopted a governmental
system which permitted controls to be evolved which would take care of
alterations in the balance of governmental powers while also allowing
potential disputes to be resolved through a process of cooperation. The
theme of cooperation, the forgotten side of separation of powers, has
characterized most of American history. It serves as the basis for a more
appropriate "test" for determining the constitutionality of the legislative
veto.
It is doubtful that the concept of separation of powers can really have
any objective meaning. . As Professor Felix Frankfurter noted:
On the whole, "separatiop of powers" has been treated by the Supreme
Court not as a technical legal doctrine. Again barring some recent
decisions, the Court has refused to draw abstract analytical lines of
separation and has recognized necessary areas of interaction among the
departments of governments ....

Enforcement of a rigid conception of

powers would make modern government impossible. The control of
'navigation, the regulation of railroad rates, the administration of the Pure
Food and Drug Act, the allocation of wave lengths, are all achieved by
refusing to treat the doctrine of separation of powers as a sterile dogma. 1 5
Cooperative interaction is to be preferred, although some conflict is both
inevitable and desirable. What may be considered an act of cooperation by
one branch, however, may be viewed as an improper intrusion by the other.
As former Attorney General Levi stated:
Inevitably in a system of divided powers, there are points where responsibility conflicts, where legitimate interests and demands appear on either
side. In such instances, accommodation and compromise reflecting the
exigencies of the matter at hand have been not only possible bu a felt
necessity. The essence of compromise is that principle or power is
surrendered by neither side, but that there is a respect for the responsiblity
of others and recognition
of the need for flexibility and reconciliation of
116
competing interests.
113

1d. at 293.

114

Miller, An Inquiry Into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers,With
Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separationof Powers, 27 ARK.L. REV. 583, 587 (1973).
"-IF.
FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT, 78 (1930).
16
' Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 386 (1976).
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A better test, simply stated, requires a balance of the need for
accountability of congressionally delegated powers with the requirement
that the effective exercise of those powers not be unduly hampered. This is a
pragmatic judgment, based on the recognition of both the goal of
eooperation and the inevitability of institutional conflict. It permits
measures to be devised which achieve avoidance of conflict through
resolution of disagreements arising from Executive misinterpretations of
.the congressional intent. Separation of powers, when it is thus viewed as a
political principle of intergovernmental resolution of conflict combined
with a principle of accountability, serves as a valid method for analyzing
the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
The advantages stemming from cooperation between the executive and
legislative branches in the area of policy formation have been noted by
proponents of the legislative veto.
One of the unique advantages of the veto, when properly used and
structured, is that in areas where such requirements [effective and
intelligent decisions on policy] are hardest to fulfill. . . .The device
provides a means of inducing Congress to take increased advantage of the
Executive's expertise and its resources for planning, cpordination, and
taking an overall view."'
Supporters of the veto claim that it offers additional benefits. Cooperation,
it is argued, produces policies which reflect a consensus of divergent
institutional interests. For that consensus to be achieved, each branch must
treat itself on an equal basis. The congressional veto, accordingly,
"functions to preserve and strengthen that equilibrium which lies at the
heart of the separation of powers principle."1 18
The congressional veto cannot be considered, by any criterion, to be per
se violative of the separation of powers doctrine. But that cannot be the
final answer; unnecessary disruption of executive branch operations must
be avoided. Legal doctrine alone cannot provide definitive answers.
Answers to the disruption questioh can only be forthcoming from data
that would demonstrate that Congress has both the institutional capacity
and the will to be in operation continuously, thereby enabling it to give:
more than perfunctory attention to executive actions submitted for review.
By no means can it now be said that Congress is capable of fulfilling that
necessary task. If Congress is to persist in its use of its veto power, and if it
is validated when a proper case reaches the Supreme Court, then the need
for institutional improvements will become imperative. That need would
" 7 The Legislative Veto, supra note 7, at 513-14.

181d. at 515. The "equilibrium" referred to is that which prevents the feared
"overconcentration of power in the hands of any one department."
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become urgent if H.R. 12,048 (or similar measures) were to become law. 1 9
That bill provides for congressional review of nearly all administrative
rules. Stoutly opposed by the Executive, it is a clear harbinger of legislative
things to come, although no concomitant institutional reform is evident.
THE VETO IN OPERATION

Analysis of the congressional veto should focus on whether the
mechanism has been exercised in a manner which achieves its basic goals.
From the few instances where it has been employed, it is clear that the mere
presence of a veto power does not serve to prevent certain acts arguably not
within a statute's terms, although, to a minor extent, Congress has
120
managed to force the President to reevaluate some proposed activities.
The failure of the congressional veto, however, is most evident in the areas
of war powers and "impoundment" of appropriated funds, where the
Executive has the distinct advantage of being able to complete actions
before Congress has a chance to respond.
Ufider the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Congress may order the
removal of United States armed forces committed by the President.' 2' As
the Mayaquez incident shows; however, troops may be deployed and
removed quite promptly. 22 By the time Congress can agree on a
concurrent resolution which will order removal, the troops may have
completed their limited mission. Even if the hostilities still continue when
Congress is ready to act, it is improbable that it will deny the President
needed support. The years that Congress took to oppose the Vietnam
conflict is vivid evidence supporting that conclusion. It is pointless to
order the President to cease operations when such activities have already
halted. The veto, if it had been exercised in the Mayaguez incident, merely
would have served to state congressional disapproval of the action. As a
mere slap on the wrist, it would have no real meaning.
"Impoundment" is another area where the President has long felt
immune from congressional control. With passage of the Budget Control
and Impoundment Act of 1974, however, the President must now submit
proposed rescissions or deferrals of budget authority to Congress. 23 Those
"1rTheAdministrative Rule Making Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). For
an update, see 123 CONG. REC., H499-H500 (daily ed. January 24, 1977) (where three new bills,
H.R. 959, 960, and 961, were introduced into the new Congress).
0
12See OREGON STATE LEGISLATIVE RES. OFF., LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE

REGULATIONS 106 (Doc. No. 76 1975).
Similar conclusions may be drawn from state
legislatures, for example, Connecticut, where the system operates to send all proposed rules to
the legislature.
12'War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. III 1973).
I22Cf. Kelley, The ConstitutionalImplications of the Mayaguez Incident, 3 HAST. CONST.
L.Q. 1301 (1976); Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE L.J. 774 (1976).
2 Military Construction Authorization Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-552, 88 Stat. 1745,
1766 (1975), (codified in scattered sections of 3. 10, 18, 31 U.S.C.).
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"impoundments" may be disapproved if either House passes a resolution
within forty-five days of the original submission.
Nevertheless, the
Executive can "impound" funds at the end of a congressional session and
avoid facing congressional disapproval. The General Accounting Office
announced in September, 1976 that President Ford had violated the Act by
delaying the report of the proposed "impoundment" of a $126 million
124
congressional appropriation for child nutrition and education programs.
Before Congress could even be in a position to respond to this action, the
government would have entered a new fiscal year, so that any proposed
response would lack effect.
Even though some veto provisions have been ineffective, Congress has
influenced executive branch policy in foreign affairs. Congress, for
example, used the concurrent resolution power of the amendments to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954125 when it approved a proposed two-year
126
extension of an atomic energy cooperation agreement with Israel.
Some general conclusions on the effectiveness of the legislative veto
may be made. In general, a President may still act in a manner contrary to
congressional policy. Nevertheless, executive activity may occasionally be
altered as a result of threats to veto proposed executive programs. In an
effort to prevent the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee from vetoing arms sales to Saudi Arabia,
President Ford agreed to reduce substantially the number of weapons to be
sold.127
Data are not available to validate the proposition that congressional
veto mechanisms unduly delay the administration of the laws. Except for
cases such as the Federal Elections Commission which in 1976 failed by two
days to meet the statutory requirement of laying before Congress for thirty
days,128 there are few instances where it can be said that executive actions are
held up for lack of congressional response. This is particularly true of the
nonstatutory vetoes-those in which executive and congressional officers
''come into agreement" on the reprogramming of appropriated funds for
example.
NEEDED REFORMS

Critics of the congressional veto have focused their arguments traditionally on abstract constitutional issues. Attention should be directed to
the practical difficulties involved in implementation of committee review
'Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5, 1976, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
125Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (Supp. V 1975).
126S. Con. Res. 15, 121 CONG. REc. S.2068 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1975), which was also
adopted by the House in lieu of H. Con. Res. 114, 121 CONG. REc. H1543-44 (daily ed. March

11, 1975).
27

1 Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1976, at A3, col. 1.
128Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1976, at Al, col. 1.
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procedures. If Congress is not ready to exercise the veto power effectively
and speedily, the whole constitutional debate may be academic. Surely the
President's constitutional duty to veto or approve statutes within ten days
should be paralleled by a like requirement for Congress to act as quickly. If

the congressional veto is to be used as a truly effective oversight technique,
the problems of haphazard analysis and institutional delay must somehow
be remedied.

No ready solution is apparent, but some matters are clear.

Congress, should it acquire the power to review all agency regulations, 1 9 must have competent staff in sufficient quantities so that adequate
analysis may be made of the highly technical issues often dealt with by

agencies. The examination should focus on the impact of proposed rules
on the social structure. There must be a means of analyzing in advance
what difference it will make to the American people if a given administrative rule is or is not promulgated. That type of review requires Congress to
create a staff structure adequate for the purpose.
Application of the congressional veto to the rulemaking process
requires that Congress take fundamental steps to achieve institutional
reorganization. It is essential that Congress operate on a full-time basis.
Executive agencies should not have to wait for Congress to return from
adjournments or recesses in order to proceed with administrative implementation of policies. Furthermore, Congress should adopt specific criteria
for analyzing proposed regulations. It might, for example, be asked
whether the regulation was the product of regularized administrative
procedures. It also should be asked whether the regulation conforms with
the policies expressed in the authorizing statute. Finally, in selecting
criteria for analysis Congress should consult with those states that have had
experience with legislative review of administrative rules.' s 0
The congressional veto is consistent with the principle-the political
theory-of separation of powers. The principle, if viewed as a theory of
political interaction, has a comprehensible meaning. It requires that the
goal of flexibility and of cooperation between the branches be central to the
operation of governmental power. One branch should not seek, nor be
allowed, to dominate the other. The branches, furthermore, should not act
as isolated units. The principle requires that they cooperate so that
political differences are resolved and urgent tasks of government are taken
care of without undue delay. The congressional veto not only serves as a
means for ensuring that delegated power be exercised as Congress originally desired, but it also forces the Executive to consult with Congress.
12 9

H.R. 12048, The Administrative Rule Making Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), if it had been passed, would have exempted from legislative review those rules which
relate to agency management or personnel as well as those relating to national defense secrets.
110Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
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That delay, speaking generally, is not undue; it is a necessary part of
American constitutionalism. It would add little delay to the already far too
slow administrative processes. The view, bruited in the 1930's, that the
agencies would prevent delay has not been validated by experience. The
standard additional time, thirty or sixty days, would not, as governmental
affairs go, be excessive. There are other and deeper problems of the public
administration.
Past discussion of the congressional veto has been noteworthy mainly
for the fact that commentators have been able to arrive at opposite
conclusions using similar premises.13' This problem can be resolved- only
if analysis focuses on constitutional principles as being expressions of a
general political philosophy rather than as specific statements of strict
rules. 3 2 When so viewed, the congressional veto may be examined in terms
of whether it can operate in a manner consistent with that philosophy. The
major issue that must be resolved, then, and the subject which should be
the focal point for future study, is whether Congress is capable of
exercising the veto in such a manner that it does not become a tool of
selective harassment which will unduly delay necessary etecutive action.

U'Compare Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 593
(1976) with Congress Steps Out, supra note 7. Both rely on the Constitutional Convention
debates and The Federalist Papers to establish the "meaning" of the Presidential veto power
and the separation of powers principle. They reach opposite conclusions; Stewart finds the
congressional veto valid, while Watson opposes the veto.
" 2See Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of a Constitutional Idea, 52 OE. L. REv. 211,213 (1973): "A constitution is inescapably the embodiment of
a political theory. It takes no great insight, therefore, to conclude that principles which guide
the allocation of power under that constitution are implicitly theories of political
organization.... [N]o analysis can proceed without an appreciation of the present realities of
political power...."

